Online life is usually held to present particular problems for ethnography as it is hidden and ambiguous, and boundaries are not clear. However, ethnography and online daily life are similar procedures in which people go about constructing 'culture' to make sense of others and interact with a degree of predictability. Ethnographers can learn about culture and society by learning how people themselves go about understanding and making those processes. We further, do not have to expect that the reality we describe will be completely ordered, even though the simplifications of constructing 'culture' might make this seem inevitable. Disorder can be socially important. 2) To show that the supposedly 'difficult features' of online research, are features of online social life which anyone online has to deal with, or which emphasise problems already found in offline ethnography.
independent of the social (1952, pp. 22-3) . When arguing against the reduction of social life to race, genetics or individualism, this could be sensible. But seeing culture as a thing in its own right (independent of people and ethnographer) leads us to treat it as a unified whole with one meaning or dynamic as if it were a single text, or work of art, to be interpreted or translated 1 . This dismisses the mess of people's ongoing production of culture and swallows people's lives in overarching homogenised text; making everything else they do irrelevant (McEachern 1998, p. 258-60) . It ignores the areas of variation, or the 'varieties of opinion' that Malinowski pointed to, which 'cannot be reduced or simplified according to any principles ' (1916/1974, p. 252) and thus avoids asking which cultural areas are the more prone to difference or variation and its generation. It separates culture irrevocably from living, surviving and struggle, imposes fixed boundaries, and ignores the ways that boundaries blend into each other.
In taking the ragged form of culture seriously, and disagreeing with Geertz that 'Culture is best seen… as a set of control mechanisms ' (1975, p. 44) , I suggest it is useful to consider culture and social life as potentially self-disrupting, or ambiguous and riddled with disagreement. As Strathern suggests, more generally, 'societies are not simply problem solving mechanisms: they are also problem creating mechanisms ' (1988, p. 33) . Similarly, if 1 The master of the latter approach is Clifford Geertz (see in particular Geertz 1975: chapter 15) . Treating culture as text may give spurious generality. Geertz can make the astounding claim that all Balinese have the same culture, 'the same general beliefs… the same broad ideas of how their society is or should be arranged' (Geertz & Geertz 1975: 2) . We would not guess from this, for example, that there were Balinese Muslims (cf Barth 1993) . culture was a perfect whole of ordering then in theory it would be possible to live our whole life within a planned programme of experience, rather than (more realistically) dealing with ambiguity and having to make things up as we go along (Rosaldo 1993, p. 99-104) . The ethnographer may need to be sensitive to these issues and not foreclose in premature wholeness and impersonality.
Difficulties of Ethnographic Life Online
Over the years, many people have suggested to me that online ethnography is impossible or dubious because of specific problems, which usually include:
• The problem of the non local field site
• The ethnographer being within their own culture
• The hiddenness of people's actions
• The ambiguous identity/biography of participants
• The absence of boundaries, and
• The nature of online space
Many of these criticisms arise in conversation, or are documented in informal forums such as the Association of Internet Researchers Mailing List, AIR-L, but it seems unfair to quote academics in communications which are not as carefully presented as they might be elsewhere, so the reader will have to take my remarks in good faith, and not as a specific refutation of a person's position.
This list is not just a list of problems faced by online ethnography, but constitutes a series of features of, and ambiguities present in, online life which cannot be ignored. They are the existential problems of such a life and everyone faces such issues. Researchers and people in online groups all have to work things out, test hypotheses, make judgments and make their culture. That these issues cannot always be resolved needs to be embraced and explored as part of ethnography, rather than used as reasons for abandoning ethnography.
These problems also resemble problems which ethnography faces offline. People can lie and hide anywhere; they can information manage the observer, they can decide the boundaries around the ethnographer, they can interpret events and communications misleadingly and so on, as may have happened with Margaret Mead in Samoa (Friedman 1983 63), but it is the oscillating movement from insider to outsider, from involved to detached that characterises ethnography.
[F]rom the perspective of the 'marginal' reflexive ethnographer, there can be no question of total commitment, 'surrender' or 'becoming'. There must always remain some part held back, some social and intellectual 'distance'. For it is in the 'space' created by this distance that the analytic work of the ethnographer gets done. Without that distance, without such analytic space, the ethnography can be little more than the autobiographical account of a personal conversion (Hamersley & Atkinson 1983, p.102 ).
This also is not strange in normal life; the ethnographer may only exaggerate the motion.
Choosing a Site
The first problem of ethnography, similar online and off, is that of choosing a site, with groups you can work with, which allow you to study your interests, without causing too much disruption 2 .
In my case, Cybermind was chosen by accident. I originally joined the group to discuss its official topics of 'the philosophical and psychological implications of subjectivity in cyberspace', while searching for a field site. However, I found List members so apparently open about their offline lives and their experiences, that it seemed probable that fieldwork would not be particularly disruptive. It was high volume so there was a lot to analyse. I also enjoyed the List which, for me, was important as I was going to spend a lot of time reading it.
The particular interests I brought to my work, such as wondering: how social control was performed without physical presence; how List life related to offline life; how communication conventions grew up; and how marked symbols were used; all seemed possible to investigate. Other topics presented themselves for research as I went along, and some topics were abandoned. I discussed the possibility of research with the moderator Alan Sondheim, who asked me to participate on the List before proceeding further. Several months later he asked me to announce my intentions to the other members and the work began. Even so, with interpretive processes generally, our attention tends to be drawn to those aspects of life which we don't understand, or which seem different. Events that make sense to us are ignored, until we find our understanding or ability to act is inadequate. As Michael Agar writes, culture is 'what happens to you when you encounter differences ' (1994, p. 20), or perhaps unexpected empathies. This works both ways for the people being studied and for the ethnographer -both can be changed by the encounter, as they both may change their 'culture' although in ways they do not always notice. Thus culture, as described, is driven by difference, by error even, rather than by sameness; a 'symbol' or 'custom' may 'mean' one thing, to one subgroup, another thing to another group. People are often strange to each other within the cultural group.
When these problems of prior knowledge, ambiguity, hiddenness and difference, are treated as issues for everyone in online life, rather than just for the ethnographer, we can explore how people deal with these features in their social life, without having to resolve them into wholeness or certainty.
Incompleteness and Hiddenness
Although much is hidden from direct observation online, it is hidden to most people; so this is, again, a feature of online life. However, in any social environment, no one, no matter how much they try, can speak to everyone, or hear or see everything that goes on. People, including the ethnographer, will always be socially placed by other people and thus be reacted to in particular ways and placed in a particular politics. Therefore there are always things they will not observe or be told. Furthermore, no description can ever be full; it always has to be abridged, and the demands of writing for a particular discipline mean that order and regularity will be imposed upon the data. When the ethnographer says that people do certain things or believe certain things, that is an approximation that, at best, will refer to what most of those who are visible to the ethnographer do on certain occasions. This order, while providing comprehension may disorder the reality by deletion. Again, this is part of the nature of social life. The society we live in, is always partly hidden, always out of our complete control or understanding. Our 'social blindness' has effects on others as we interact with them and sometimes fail to interact satisfactorily. We do our best to make sense of life 105ff.). It is, however, clear that people can deceive as much in face-to-face, as they can online, but this does not seem to be as high on people's list of fears.
Cybermind tended to be confessional and relatively open. People talked about themselves, and these confessions could be compared to previous discussions and confessions (and frequently were by other people). Long-term residence with the group helps the ethnographer (and group member) to discover, and check up, more about other participants.
People also gossiped about their experience with others. Thus if someone travelled to meet someone else and their appearance was not as expected from photographs, then that might be discussed offlist, as would failed relationships, conjectures about the motives of others and so on 6 5 We might think of the ongoing tales of gender impersonation, of hidden paedophiles, of Nigerian spam frauds and so on.
. Only comparatively rarely did this kind of discussion reach the public face of the list (it was hidden), so the ethnographer, like other involved members, needs to delve into the non- As this implies, the argument that we can never know things entirely accurately, or that we can never give a definitive interpretation of what others are or are saying, is not an argument against trying to know as well as we can. If reality is vague, then that has to be factored into the research.
Lack of Boundaries
Because people rarely live online in just one internet group, the idea of group boundaries is challenged, and internet ethnography automatically has a tendency to become what Marcus has called 'multi-sited ' (1999, p. 79ff p. 63), or that cultural construction and creativity does not happen online -merely that the borders are imprecise and multi-sited. Some online forums such as Twitter, for example, might take their meaning primarily from offline life, others from online life. These permeable, or 'asent', boundaries need to be investigated, rather than discarded.
As implied above, the interactions between people on Cybermind which occurred offlist and in other forums was an important part of the List dynamics. For many members, the List intersected beneficially with their offline lives (Marshall 2007, pp. 241ff.) . Boundaries between 'virtual' and 'real' were not firm at all.
The internet, and these ongoing boundary ambiguities, draws attention to a central and rarely studied feature of modern life namely the temporary and voluntary associations that people form which may be separated, to some extent, from their daily lives. These can include:
'support groups', religious meetings, fitness classes, a group of fellow clubbers, sporting associations and so on. The people a person meets at these various groups may be kept quite separate from each other and, say, from their work life. People in the West seem to compartmentalise their lives as part of their general culture, and perhaps this enables their distinctions between online and offline lives at this moment. As more and more of their friends come online, this distinction may evaporate (as may be the case with Facebook). As it seems impossible to describe a person's social life by observing their behaviour in one place, we have to recognise these other places, and may try and find out about them as part of our ethnography.
Compartmentalisation may also mean that a person or group may act differently depending on the social form of the online group, say whether the online group is connected with work, is connected with neighbours, or is largely anonymous etc. Again, we cannot assume that online activity is separated from offline life. 
Place?
Clearly place can no longer be use to draw boundaries around social lives, although place and culture can still have an effect. Online place, is further constituted by texts or graphics, or both, all of which affect the kinds of things that can be done in that space, the way it is used and the way messages will be interpreted. It is always a 'locale' to use Gidden's term (1984, p. 118) . This locale gives information about the ways that the space should be used and the kinds of things which should be done. Similarities of place, code for similarity of action and behaviour. People tend to use the conventions of locale to define their internet group, or the internet in general as a specific kind of locale for political and rhetorical purposes, although this does not imply instant unity (Marshall 2001).
The social constitution of online space does not mean that the online world is deterritorialised. As well as being immersed in offline networks, people are situated in particular conventional spaces when they access the internet. These spaces can affect the ways they can access the internet, the kinds of things they can access, the speed with which they can respond, and the risks involved in that access. It may also influence whether they are 
Archive and Memory
That Cybermind had archives, together with my own collection of emails, meant that it was often possible to 'relive' events and check if my memories were accurate. This often produced interesting discrepancies, which could be investigated; something which is impossible in normal fieldwork. In this case, ethnographic notebooks, with their spur of the moment interpretations of events, do not completely replace what happened. However, notebooks are still useful to remind the ethnographer of how they saw and felt events at the time.
With archives it is possible to observe what factors are important for how memories, or narratives of things, were constructed, by comparison. For example, I observed that for events in which the group had seemed flooded with flame, the flaming messages often turned out to be quite a small proportion of the total messages. As a result, I could suggest that the perception of flooding occurred because these messages had a coherent tone and subject, while the other messages tended to be fragmented in tone and subject, thus not making as much subjective impact. Times in which the coherence of one set of messages seemed dominant were also the most memorable times on the list, for me and for others, and were often used to justify particular behaviours, conventions, or special times onlist, such as when the death of List co-founder Michael Current was frequently remembered as marking the birth of List community. Inaccurate perceptions can have a big effect on social life.
However, reading archives is not equivalent to experiencing life on the group. In reading the archives the ethnographer is missing the varying density of messages, the speed with which they arrive and so on, and hence the ambient moods which influenced how people read the group (whether hurriedly of slowly for example), or the way they interpret the group in terms Likewise hiddenness suggests that the ethnographer might be able to deceive the group they are investigating and gain perspectives from another social role. This process is likely to reproduce category clichés, as the ethnographer goes about performing those roles, and provoking responses, by the conventions they already 'know'. Hence they might not learn as much as they expect.
On the whole, the greatest objections that people on Cybermind had to any research was when it was unannounced, was announced with no possibility of participation, or when they just discovered the publications. So ethical problems emerge. To avoid these problems and to be open about the research, all my writings about the List, were made available to List members before publication for comment and/or protest. This proved a useful way of getting further information, and correcting overt errors, but clearly could be difficult if the group wanted to remain closed to the outside world, or if people had objected to publication; it is possible openness can lead to closure. open, then how do we acknowledge the group in our work? Over the ten years I was researching Cybermind, the issue of how people should be quoted came up many times.
Problems of Sourcing
While changing people's names is standard practice in internet ethnography (cf Kendal 2002, pp. 241-2), this practice both denies the obligation, and the role of the group in producing the ideas of analysis. Making people anonymous also brings up questions of intellectual property rights as Gurak points out (1997, p. 137), especially for people who live by payment for ideas and texts. By not attributing statements, ideas or art works, the ethnographer is potentially engaged in theft, and putting hard boundaries in place to support their own livelihood.
Removing names suggests that boundaries between ethnographer and subject are easily maintained, which, as we have seen, is debateable. These hidden obligations can be exploited by the ethnographer to make their version of the culture seem radically different from the version espoused by members of the group. By referring to people it becomes easier to trace the way the ethnographer's ideas have risen out of interactions with the group and owe their existence to the group, rather than to a privileged and autonomous academic tradition. By acknowledging others, those others are able to say that I, as ethnographer, have misunderstood. If identity is made uncertain or people are blended into fictions then this is impossible. While acknowledgement increases the vulnerability of the ethnographer to questioning, it could also increase their commitment to being accurate. Yet, it is clearly possible for identification to lead to problems for the group (Reid 1996) In general, Cybermind members objected to the List's name and long-time members'
identities being concealed unless they requested, or when their words may be the unconsidered words of a moment. So I worked with this, privately deciding not to name people if the topics being written about could be considered potentially harmful to them and to keep private correspondence and interviews anonymous unless otherwise requested.
Finally, given many passing people may not have been aware of the research, I usually quoted such people anonymously. Any practices of acknowledgement would have to vary with the group, and be in consultation with the group, but there are no clear guidelines which can satisfy everybody in every situation; that is the nature of social life.
Online Ethnography and Culture: Conclusions
Ethnography involves participating in life with the group being studied, recording what happens and interacting with its members, for a relatively long time to gain familiarity with events and local meanings. It may make use of many tools such as: surveys, interviews, spontaneous queries, counting words in texts, comparing notebooks with archives, recording of our own experiences, and so on. Ethnographic practice and convention has to adapt to the group being studied, the kinds of problems the ethnographer is interested in, and to the audience being written for; therefore it cannot always be defined adequately in advance; it is inherently ambiguous. Choosing a group to research is always something of a haphazard matter. It is perhaps best to approach the group with relatively clear topics for investigation while expecting that some will be abandoned and other topics will appear. What is discovered will partly be contingent, depending on the events that happen, and the events people talk about. While the ethnographer may participate passionately, they may find it useful to oscillate, to question themselves -especially about their certainties, and what they find as differences. It is also useful to remember that the ethnographer's problems in carrying out their work may be similar to the problems that other people have. As all sites are unique and have particular issues, it is therefore useful to have some familiarity with other sites and other ethnographies for comparative purposes.
Much of any life, but particularly life online, is hidden. The ethnographer has to be aware of this, and the limits of their knowledge. This is a problem for anyone online, so we can study how people attempt to resolve that problem together with the consequences of that attempted resolution. Rather than being put off by hiddenness, we can investigate the social effects of that hiddenness and people's fears, uncertainties or certainties about it. This may require that we try and participate in the life around the online group, and move into other spaces online and off. Boundaries are vague and crossed all the time, so it may be useful to investigate those boundaries, to find what we and others bring to the group from offline life, and what we take back to offline life. Online worlds are not entire in themselves, but the level of interdependence may vary with the particular world. We oscillate between involved and detached, between local and other groups. Like everyone we are not just insiders. One further consequence of these blurred boundaries is that we cannot assume that we and our theories, or understandings, are disconnected from the group's culture. Ethnography is inherently collaborative, and this raises issues around acknowledging the group and its members.
In making sense of what people in the group being studied do, how they interact, and how they interpret others, the ethnographer is explicitly constructing a model of 'culture'. This is a Culture is what enables a person to tell, or to make a case that, an event is significant. As such it involves conjecture about the motives, or behaviour, of others. It tries to make the hidden visible. In this understanding, one event cannot be understood without understanding other events, and hence the culture made by the ethnographer tends to become relatively coherent and possibly hide the actual disjunctures of life. Furthermore, the tools the ethnographer uses to understand events will change the model of culture they come up with.
The ambiguity of, and disagreement over, the term 'culture' in academia shows that contestation and variation of meaning, is part of culture in general. Variation and argument is important. Simplification will occur, and it is easy to smooth over problems, or to delete events that cannot be integrated into the model and which are thus labelled as random or unimportant, so simplification needs care. Everyday life is messy, and this mess may be creative. As Barth argues, variation or misperformance within a society cannot simply be considered an epiphenomenon, or 'noise' produced by an underlying order, and thus irrelevant. Variation 'should emerge as a necessity from our analysis' (Barth 1993, p. 4) .
There is likely to be more than one culture in the group, and cultures are likely not to have neat or logically consistent boundaries. Any boundaries, and the mechanisms whereby they come to exist, have to be discovered. So will the effects of online 'place' and its nature.
This view also tends to help us see that society and culture are not just mechanisms of order (however sophisticatedly homeostatic), in which human behaviour is reduced to the side effects of ambiguously present, or 'asent', structures. Societies and cultures can also be mechanisms of disordering. We tend to perceive 'order' as imposed upon 'chaos', when particular kinds of social order might depend upon, or create, particular types of 'chaos'.
Contemporary global capitalism might depend on its ability to make and distribute garbage, yet the abundance of garbage may threaten it. Cybermind's ways of making 'community' could also undermine that community (Marshall 2007 conflict can be the site of, or provocation for, cultural creation. Similarly, abandoning an association of culture with order allows us to look at the ways in which societies head for disaster through their modes of ordering (such as extending the order of markets), and help us not to reduce all problems to inadequacies. Furthermore, we don't have to assume smooth continuity, or complete disjunction between cultural artefacts. Their relationship might be an ongoing point of negotiation and conflict, and might never be entirely resolved.
Everyone is jointly engaged in interpretation and making sense of others, in making culture for others, and then using this model as a tool to interact with those others. Everyone is trying to make sense of daily life and trying to make the behaviour of others predictable and to use 'cultural tools' persuasively so as to fit into the valued categories which are open to them. As such, the problems of the ethnographer exemplify the same kind of problems that people experience online. They are not problems to be avoided but to be explored, as are the ways that people go about dealing with these problems themselves, as it might tell ethnographers something useful for their research. While, ethnographic models might be more formal than most, and hopefully have a wider than usual view of the issues involved, what ethnographers are doing is not unique. We are all constructing 'culture' with each other and for each other;
conducting battles, and harmonies for the life of the group. As Hine writes, the position that internet ethnography is particularly unreliable, 'changes somewhat if we recognise that the ethnographer could instead be construed as needing to have similar experiences to those of informants, however those experiences are mediated ' (2000, p. 10) . The next step is to realise the basic similarity of procedures involved, and that the group's perceived culture will be different for different people; there is no overarching single vision. It is always based in interpretation, experience and conflict. Ethnography is not above, but within, cultural interaction.
